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A NEW LOOK FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION:
THE PROPOSED REVISION
OF FLORIDA'S EDUCATION GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
PATRmICIA A. DRAPER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Constitution Revision Commission has proposed sweeping
and fundamental changes in state control of public education in
Florida. First, the commission has proposed replacing the elected
State Board of Education-consisting of the Governor and Cabinet-and its elected commissioner of education with appointed substitutes.' If this proposal is approved by the voters, more than a
century of Cabinet dominance of public education would end. Second, the commission has proposed elevating the Board of Regents,
the statutory board currently governing Florida's universities,' to
constitutional status.3 If approved by the electorate, this proposal
would assure continued power for the regents over the state university system.
This article explores these recommended changes.' Part II discusses the existing law relating to the State Board of Education and
the Board of Regents. Part III analyzes the proposed revision pertaining to the State Board of Education and the commissioner of
education, including a study of the proposed interrelationships between the respective powers of the State Board of Education and of
the Board of Regents. Part IV deals with the proposed grant of
constitutional status to the Board of Regents and discusses the effect such a change would have on current legislative power. Finally,
Part V assesses the advantages and the possible disadvantages of
the proposed changes.
* J.D. 1977, Florida State University College of Law. Ms. Draper served as co-counsel to
the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission as well as to the commission's Committee on
Education.
1. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. IV, § 4 (May 11, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Rev. Fla.
Const.J; id. art. IX, § 2. The 1968 Florida Constitution provides for six elected Cabinet
officers-secretary of state, attorney general, comptroller, treasurer, commissioner of agriculture, and commissioner of education. The revision commission has proposed abandoning
these positions entirely. See id. art. IV, § 4.
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 240.001, .042 (1977).
3. Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IX, § 7.
4. This article will not explore the proposed change in art. IX, § 1 of the Florida Constitution, which provides that the primary purpose of elementary and secondary education in this
state shall be to develop the ability of each student to "read, communicate and compute and
to provide an opportunity for vocational training."
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HISTORY OF FLORIDA'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Florida's education system at the state level-in contrast to the
local level-is multifaceted. Day-to-day control over the basic education system, kindergarten through twelfth grade, is exercised by
an elected commissioner of education. 5 In contrast, day-to-day control over the state university system [hereinafter referred to as
"SUS"] is exercised by a Board of Regents.' The regents are appointed by the Governor In turn, the regents appoint the chancellor, who is the chief executive officer of the SUS and serves as the
regents' chief advisor.8 Community colleges are regulated by local
boards of trustees whose members, like the regents, are appointed
by the Governor." And supervising all of these bodies is the ex-officio
State Board of Education [hereinafter referred to as "State
Board"], which is charged by the current constitution with supervising this system to the extent provided by law. 0 The State Board
consists of the Governor and the Cabinet.1
A.

The State Board of Education

1. Pre-1968 System
Since the ratification of the 1868 constitution, Florida's state education system has been controlled either by the entire Cabinet or by
a number of its officers and the Governor, sitting as the State Board
of Education.
Under the 1868 constitution, the State Board consisted of three
of the then eight Cabinet officers: the superintendent of public instruction, the secretary of state, and the attorney general. 12 The
Governor maintained control through his choice of Cabinet appointees since, at that time, the Cabinet was appointed by the Governor. 3 The board's duties were left to the sole discretion of the legislature.1 The superintendent of public instruction, referred to as the
commissioner of education under the present constitution, 5 exer5. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(g); id. art. IX, § 2.
6. FLA. STAT. §§ 20.15(3), 240.001 (1977). Section 20.15(6) requires that regents be approved by three Cabinet members and confirmed by the senate.
7. Note that the appointments are for nine-year terms.
8. FLA. STAT. § 240.042(2)(c) (1977).
9. Id. §§ 20.15(7), 230.753-.754. Section 20.15(7) further requires that community college
trustees be approved by three Cabinet members and confirmed by the senate.
10. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
11. Id.
12. FA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 9.
13. Id. art. V, § 17. It was not until 1886 that the Cabinet became an elected body. FLA.
CONST. of 1885, art. IV, § 20.
14. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 9.
15. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(a).
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cised general supervision over the state education system."
The 1885 constitution created the now familiar elected State
Board of Education. 7 The Governor and treasurer joined the board,
with the Governor replacing the superintendent of public instruction as president of the board."8 The board's powers were expanded
constitutionally to include specifically the power to remove subordinate school officers for cause, to invest and manage state school
funds under regulations prescribed by law, and to supervise the
schools of higher grades as provided by law." The supervisory duties
of the superintendent of public instruction over the public education system were carried forward from the 1868 constitution."
2. Current Law
The 1968 constitution designated the Governor and Cabinet as
the State Board of Education, thereby adding to the board the
comptroller and the commissioner of agriculture. 2' Under this latest
constitution, the legislature continues to have discretion to set the
boundaries of the State Board's supervisory duties and powers.22
The legislature has assigned the State Board substantial power over
policy and coordination of the public education system. 3 Pursuant
to statute, the board adopts rules needed to improve the education
system; directs the Department of Education, which serves as its
administrative arm;25 and adopts educational objectives, plans, and
programs aimed at developing the system it coordinates. 2
The State Board's constitutional supervisory power extends to all
levels of the public education system, including the state university
system." However, while it is empowered to exercise general supervision and control over the Board of Regents, and, as part of this
supervision, must approve all Board of Regents rules and regula16. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VII, § 7; id. art. VIII, § 3.
17. FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. XII, § 3.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. art. IV, § 25; id. art. XII, § 2.
21. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4; id. art. IX, § 2.
22. Id. art. IX, § 2.
23. FLA. STAT. § 229.053 (1977). For a more detailed treatment of the statutorily assigned
duties and powers of the State Board, see P. Draper, Summary of Statutory Duties and
Reponsibilities of the State Board of Education, Commissioner of Education, Department of
Education, Community College Board of Trustees, and the Board of Regents (Dec. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Summary] (available in the art. IX, § 2 reference file of the Constitution Revision Commission).
24. FLA. STAT. §§ 229.053, .76 (1977).
25. For a more complete analysis of the Department of Education, see Summary, supra
note 23, at 6-8.
26. FLA. STAT. § 229.053 (1977).
27. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
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tions,28 day-to-day supervision of the state universities as well as
important policy questions are actually handled by the regents.2 '
Under the present constitution, the commissioner of education
follows in his predecessor's footsteps: the commissioner is elected
and is empowered to supervise the public education system in the
manner provided by law.3 The relationship between the commissioner and the State Board is established by general law, with the
commissioner serving as the chief administrative officer of the
board.3 However, the commissioner's responsibilities relating to the
for the Board of Regents
university system are limited by statute,
32
and the chancellor govern the SUS.
B.

The Board of Regents

The Board of Regents, currently a creature of statute, exercises
only those powers and performs only those duties prescribed by the
legislature. Under present law, the regents have the primary responsibility for the management of the SUS. 3 The regents are empowered to "govern, regulate, coordinate, and oversee the institutions
and agencies" of the SUS.Y Among its various powers and duties,
the Board of Regents adopts rules by which the SUS is managed and
operated, 35 appoints a chancellor to carry out its policies, 3' appoints
and removes university presidents, 37 and approves all state university budgets.3 '
This division of supervisory power over higher education between
the Board of Regents and the State Board of Education has continued basically unchanged since 1905 when the Board of Regents was
3
referred to as the Board of Control. '
FLA. STAT. § 240.031(1) (1977).
29. Id. § 240.042(2)(a).
30. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4(g).
31. FLA. STAT. § 229.512 (1977).
32. Id. § 240.001.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 240.042(2)(a).
36. Id. § 240.042(2)(c).
37. Id. § 240.042(2)(d).
38. Id. § 240.042(2)(e).
39. Act of June 5, 1905, ch. 5384, § 19, 1905 Fla. Laws 37 (current version at FLA. STAT.
ch. 240 (1977)).

28.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

1978l

III. PROPOSED REVISION OF THE POWERS AND
DUTIES OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION

A.

Proposed Revision to Article IX, Section 2

The proposed revision places responsibility for the coordination,
regulation, and supervision of public education in the hands of a
nine-member citizens' board appointed by the Governor." State
Board members would serve six-year terms instead of the current
four 1 and would be subject to confirmation by the senate. The Governor would select one of the members to serve as chairperson of the
board, and this member would serve in that position at the pleasure

of the Governor. 2 The effective date of this proposed revision requires that Governor Askew's successor choose the State Board
membership. 3
Only one of the State Board's officers would remain elected: the
commissioner of education, who is elected pursuant to the existing
constitution and who also serves as a member of the Cabinet." The
commissioner's powers and duties would be basically the same as
under present law. 5 The proposed revision further provides that if
the office of elected commissioner of education is abolished, the
position of state education chief-commissioner of education-would become an appointed position to be filled by a lay State
Board.'"
Since abolition of the Cabinet is to be considered separately by

the voters at the same time an education commissioner is to be
elected, the commission adopted, as part of the State Board of
Education proposal, a schedule which clearly decides the fate of the
elected commissioner if the voters agree to abolish the Cabinet. 7
The schedule provides that if the voters abolish the Cabinet, the
40. For the text of the revision, introduced as Proposal 194, see Appendix to this issue.
41. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(a); Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IX, § 2(b).
42. Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IX, § 2(b).
43. FiA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(c) provides that a revision becomes effective on the first
Tuesday after the first Monday in January following the election at which it is adopted, unless
otherwise specified in the revision. No such exception is contained in this proposed revision.
The term of the Governor begins the same day-the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
January of the year succeeding the election. See id. art. IV, § 5(a).
44. Id. § 4(g).
45. Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IX, § 2(d), states that the commissioner of
education shall administer the board's policies and rules, manage the education program
under the jurisdiction of the board, and perform such other duties and exercise such powers
as are provided by law. This listing of duties essentially follows the commissioner's duties as
provided by general law. See FLA. STAT. § 229.512 (1977).
46. Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IX, § 2(c).
47. Id. § 2, at Schedule (b).
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commissioner elected in the 1978 election will serve out his or her
term in a dual capacity as the State Board of Education's ninth
member and chairperson of the board and as a Cabinet officer in a
Cabinet with no responsibility for education. 8 This officer would
not be divested of the duties and powers for which he or she was
elected until the appointment of a new education chief."' The board
would have the authority to choose its own administrative officer to
carry out the previous commissioner's duties. 0 To eliminate confusion, the appointed official filling the commissioner's shoes would
be known temporarily as the director of education. 5'
The plan of an appointed board served by an elected commissioner was an afterthought. Though substantially mirroring the California system of education-and therefore dubbed by the revisionists as the California Plan-the proposal was adopted after it appeared that the revision product might be split up on the ballot
(with the question of Cabinet abolition standing alone), thus necessitating a proposal that could accommodate either an elected or an
appointed commissioner." The original proposal provided for both
an appointed State Board and commissioner. It was based on the
assumption that the Cabinet would be abolished and with it the
3
office of elected commissioner of education.5
48. Cabinet abolition, if adopted, would not become effective until January 4, 1983, see
Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IV, Schedule with Regard to Abolition of Cabinet,
(f), while the State Board proposal would take effect four years earlier, on January 2, 1979,
see note 43 supra.
49. Paragraph (b) of the schedule to art. IX, § 2 was amended by the addition of the words
"but shall remain commissioner of education until a new commissioner is appointed by the
board," to cover the hiatus between election of the commissioner and appointment of a new
commissioner of education which would occur if the office of elected education commissioner
were abolished in the 1978 general election. See Amendment 8 to art. IX, § 2, introduced and
explained at 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 49 (Mar. 8, 1978) (remarks of Chairman
Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte). This schedule provision was later amended pursuant to a
suggestion by the Committee on Style and Drafting (amendment 72, adopted Apr. 14, 1978),
but this particular provision remained substantially unchanged. 30 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 561
(Apr. 14, 1978).
50. Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IX, § 2(c); id. § 2, at Schedule
(b).
51. Id. § 2, at Schedule (b).
52. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 5-6 (Mar. 9, 1978) (remarks of James Kynes);
see CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 18000-32999 (West 1978).
53. Proposal 194, as originally introduced, provided:
SECTION 2. State board of education.(a) There shall be TZ)geveepand-themembemof-he-eabinet-etudienetiette
a state board of education, which shall be a body corporate and have the responsibility for coordination of the state system of public education. The board shall also
have such supervision of the system of public education as is provided by law.
(b) The board shall consist of nine electors, who shall be appointed by the
governor and confirmed by the senate for staggered six-year terms. The governor
shall appoint a chairperson who shall serve at his pleasure.
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B.

The Debate

Alteration of the present composition of the State Board of Education was one of 232 issues initially approved by the commission
for further study." The idea received a dismal reception from the
commission's Committee on Education. First the committee temporarily passed the idea pending a decision by the Committee on the
Executive Article on the issue of Cabinet abolition." Then, faced
with prolonged inaction by the executive committee, the education
committee adopted a proposal to replace reference to the Cabinet
in the State Board of Education section with a listing of current
Cabinet officers. 5
(c) The board, with approval of the governor, shall appoint a commissioner of
education who shall serve at the pleasure of the board. He shall advise and counsel
the board and its committees, administer the board's policies, rules, and regulations, direct the department of education, and perform such other duties and exercise such powers provided by law or as the board directs.
SECTION . Schedule.(a) The commissioner of education provided for in Article IV in office on the
effective date of this revision shall become chairperson of he board of education and
serve at the pleasure of the board. If not retained for four years, he shall be fully
compensated for the loss of emoluments for the remainder of the term he would
have served as commissioner of education.
(b) The other members of the state board of education shall serve a term of six
years, except that the terms of the original members shall expire as follows:
(1) The terms of three members shall expire on January 1, 1981;
(2) The terms of three members shall expire on January 1, 1983;
(3) The terms of two members shall expire on January 1, 1985.
(c) Until changed by law, the state board of education shall continue to have
the powers, duties and responsibilities granted the state board of education established under Article IX. Section 2 in effect prior to the effective date of this revision.
54. Issue No. 205, Fla. C.R.C., Summary of Proposed Revisions to the Florida Constitution 57 (Sept. 27, 1977), presented the question of whether a "state board of education
[should be created] in lieu of the cabinet [which should have] the authority" currently
provided by art. IX, § 2. The complete list of issues relating to the State Board was as follows:
§ 2. Whether Article IX, § 2, providing for a state board of education, should be
modified to:
(a) remove limitations on the power of the legislature to restructure educational governance in the state.
(b) provide for an independently elected state board of education.
(c) provide for a state board of education composed of non-elected professional educators.
(d) include supervision of private schools.
(e) provide for an elected "chancellor of postsecondary education", to operate under an elected commissioner of education.
(f) create a "state board of education" in lieu of the cabinet having the
authority provided by this section.
(g) require the state to provide technical assistance in English, literacy and
related curriculum revisions.
Id.
55. Fla. C.R.C., Education Committee Minutes 2 (Oct. 5, 1977).
56. Fla. C.R.C., Education Committee Minutes 4 (Oct. 19, 1977). This proposal was
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The first hint of commission sentiment against the elected State
Board came when the commission acted on this proposal. Commissioner James W. Kynes, chairperson of the education committee,
introduced the proposal and stated the committee's desire that a
State Board composed of elected officers be retained.57 Commission
Chairman Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, who would later emerge as
the chief proponent of the lay State Board, then offered an amendment to provide that the State Board would be constituted as prescribed by law permitting the board's membership to be designated
by the legislature.5 8
D'Alemberte argued that the elected status of the State Board
and commissioner was the "worst form of organizaton for education
of any that's ever been proposed, except possibly [one] which
would also have the chancellor [of the Board of Regents]
elected." 5 In support of his amendment, he cited the recommendations of four education study commissions. 0 These recommendations were later to play a large role in the commission's consideration of his proposal for a lay State Board. The D'Alemberte amendment prevailed by a vote of twenty-three to eight."
However, the commission ultimately reversed itself by deciding
specifically to require a lay State Board. This proposal, which was
adopted as amended on January 12, 1978, provided the basic structure for the final revision. 2
As first introduced, the proposal granted coordinative responsibility to the board (in addition to the power of supervision provided
by law) in order to make clear that the State Board would continue
to have policymaking power, even over the SUS.1 3 Chairman
D'Alemberte was the chief advocate of the proposal, which was also
sponsored by Commissioners Thomas Barkdull, Lew Brantley,
Mark Hollis, John DeGrove, James Kynes, and Donald Reed.
D'Alemberte supported the idea by recalling four education study
commissions which-in 1929, 1947, 1967 and 1973-recommended
the creation of a lay State Board that would have a role in employing the commissioner of education.6 4 Copies of these studies were
introduced to the commission as Proposal 92.

57. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 272-73 (Nov. 21, 1977).
58. Amendment 1 to Proposal 92, id. at 273.
59. Id. at 274.
60. See note 64 infra.
61. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 315 (Nov. 21, 1977).
62. For the text of Proposal 194, see note 53 supra.
63. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 16-19 (Jan. 12, 1978) (remarks of Chairman
Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte).
64. The Florida Educational Survey Commission, Official Report (1929); Florida Citizens
Committee on Education, Education and the Future of Florida (March 1947); State of Flor-
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supplied to the commissioners before introduction of the proposal
which brought the final revision. A memorandum prefacing the
studies, submitted by Chairman D'Alemberte to the commissioners
several days before floor consideration of the proposal, quoted the
1973 study to the effect that "[creation of a lay board to coordinate
and develop policy for all levels of education] should be brought
about even if no other changes are made in the governance of education in Florida." 65
Chairman D'Alemberte argued that a confused line of authority
exists under the current system of education governance."
Consider the plight of an elected Commissioner of Education in
Florida. That gentleman is elected by the people of Florida. He
works with a system, however, that is in large part appointed by
the governor.
The governor appoints the Board of Regents, appoints the community college trustees. And he himself is only a single member
of the State Board of Education. He is [only] one of [seven]
voting members.
Commissioners Kynes, Birchfield, and Barkdull moved to amend
the proposal to provide that the commissioner of education elected
in November, 1978 would become chairperson of the board and serve
for a term of four years, rather than leave his or her retention to the
discretion of the State Board. 8 Calling this a fairness amendment,
Commissioner Kynes argued that the commissioner of education
elected in 1978 was entitled to have a voice in education and that,
as chairperson of the board, he or she would have a forceful voice
in state educational policies.6 ' The commissioners adopted this
7
amendment by a voice vote. 1
C.

The Sharing of Powers by the Board of Education
and the Board of Regents

The proposed revision would empower the State Board of Educaida, Governor's Commission For Quality Education, Toward Excellence: Changing Concepts
For Education in Florida (Dec. 22, 1967); State of Florida, The Governor's Citizens' Committee on Education, Improving Education in Florida (Mar. 15, 1973) (all available in the art.
IX, § 2 reference file of the Constitution Revision Commission).
65. Memorandum from Sandy D'Alemberte to the Commissioners 2 (Jan. 9, 1978) (available in the art. IX, § 2 reference file of the Constitution Revision Commission).
66. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 15 (Jan. 12, 1978).
67. Id.
68. Amendment 1 to Proposal 194, id. at 16.
69. Id. at 63-64.
70. Id. at 78.
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tion to manage, supervise, and coordinate the state public education system as prescribed by law not inconsistent with the provisions of article IX, section 7, relating to the Board of Regents. Under
the proposed article IX, section 7, the Board of Regents would be
directed to govern, operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the SUS, subject to the overall coordinative responsibilities of the State Board of Education. Understandably, the question arises whether the State Board would have any
powers over the SUS or the Board of Regents.
As originally drafted, the State Board and the Board of Regents
proposals did not contain the language referring to the powers
granted the other entity." The apparent overlap of power inherent
in these seemingly conflicting grants was pointed out by the Committee on Style and Drafting." The commission then adopted an
amendment making the powers of the State Board "not inconsistent" with those granted the Board of Regents. 3 A second amendment made the powers of the Board of Regents "subject to the
overall [coordinative] responsibilities" of the State Board of Education.7 ' Commissioner Kynes, sponsor of the Board of Regents proposal and cosponsor of the amendments to clarify the overlap of
powers, stated during floor debate that the amendment to the State
Board of Education provision would give the State Board the overall
coordinative responsibility for the entire system of education, which
75
would include the SUS.
This problem is particularly timely. The Board of Regents recently considered a plan defining the specific role of each institution
within the SUS as a whole. One of the plan's initial provisions
singled out two of the nine state universities for extensive graduate
development; graduate programs at seven other institutions were to
be deemphasized." Arguably, this provision is one which relates to
coordination of the system of public education and thus would be
within the jurisdiction of the State Board under the proposed revi71. For the text of Proposal 194, see note 53 supra.
72. Fla. C.R.C., Comm. on Style and Drafting, Report to the Florida Constitution Revision Commission n.38 (Mar. 6, 1978). The problem was brought to the committee's attention
in Staff Comments, Style and Drafting Committee (Feb. 14, 1978), presented and discussed
at the Feb. 15, 1978 meeting of the committee. See Fla. C.R.C., Style and Drafting Committee Minutes 22-24 (Feb. 14-16, 1978).
73. Amendment 11 to art. IX, § 2, Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 75-76 (Mar. 8,
1978) (remarks of LeRoy Collins).
74. Amendment 10 to art. IX, § 7, id. at 50.
75. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 52 (Mar. 8, 1978).
76. State University System of Florida, Board of Regents, Systemwide Role and Scope
Policy Guidelines of the State University System of Florida (July 1978) (interim draft).
77. Id.
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sion. If the state system of education were weak in graduate program
offerings in a particular geographical area, the State Board would
seem to be the proper entity to coordinate university graduate programs to rectify the imbalance.
The solution may depend on whether the State Board's power of
coordination with regard to the SUS is defined as intrasystem, the
power to coordinate within, or intersystem, the power to coordinate
between different levels of the public education system. Commissioner Kynes has stated that he believes that the State Board's
power with regard to the Board of Regents is intersystem only.78 The
revision history does not clarify this question. However, an argument may be made that only intersystem coordination by the State
Board was intended with regard to SUS because the words "overall
coordinative powers" were used in the Board of Regents proposal. 7
IV.
A.

BOARD OF REGENTS

The Proposed Revision

The revision proposed by the Constitution Revision Commission
elevates the Board of Regents to constitutional status and assures a
unified university system."'
Under this proposal the essential components of the board would
be substantially similar to those already provided by statute. Consistent with current law,"' individual regents would be appointed by
the Governor to staggered terms; their terms, however, would be
reduced from nine to six years except for one member whose term
would be two years.82 Further, there would be only nine members"
rather than the current ten, after completion of the transition period between the statutory and constitutional provisions. The transition schedule provides that regents in office on the effective date
of the revision serve out the remainder of their terms," thus raising
the possibility that there will be a ten-member board of regents
until at least six months after the effective date of the revision."
78. Conversation with Commissioner James Kynes (Apr. 7, 1978).
79. Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IX, § 7(b).
80. For the text of the revision, introduced as Proposal 93, see Appendix to this issue.
81. FLA. STAT. § 240.011 (1977).
82. Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IX, § 7(c).
83. Id.
84. FLA. STAT. § 240.011 (1977).
85. Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IX, § 7, Schedule.
86. Whether there will be an oversized Board of Regents depends on whether all 10
statutory positions are filled on January 2, 1979, the effective date of the revision. Its duration
depends on how long the grandfathered members remain in office. If no unexpected vacancies
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A grant of constitutional status to the governing board of the
system of higher education was one of the 232 issues selected for
consideration by the commission from more than 800 raised during
public hearings held by the commission and from mail and other
comments.87 A proposal to provide limited constitutional autonomy
to the regents, substantially similar to that later adopted by the full
commission, was approved unanimously by the commission's Committee on Education." Commissioner Kynes, chairperson of the
committee and sponsor of the proposal, stated that his intent was
to "implant in the Constitution the powers that the Legislature,
through Statute, has already given the board" to protect the university system from the changing whims of the legislature rather
than to make the Board of Regents strictly autonomous.89 He noted
recent instances of legislative attempts to create censorship boards
to review university film offerings as an example of the problem with
occur, the first vacancy of a refillable position would occur December 31, 1979, when Regent
J.J. Daniel's term is scheduled to expire. Terms of the current board members are scheduled
to expire as follows:
Student
Regent
It
"
f
I
"
t

regent: Aug. 31, 1979
No. 1 : Dec. 31, 1979
1, 2 : Dec. 31, 1980
'1 3 : Dec. 31, 1981
'1 4 : Dec. 31, 1982
11 5 : Dec. 31, 1983
'1 6 : Dec. 31, 1984
It 7 : Dec. 31, 1985
8 : Dec. 31, 1986
9 : Dec. 31,1987

87. Issue No. 209, Fla. C.R.C., Constitution Revision Commission Issue List (List of 232)
21 (Sept. 28, 1977), framed the question of whether article IX should be revised to provide
for a Board of Regents with exclusive control and direction of funds appropriated to SUS.
88. The proposal, approved at the Oct. 19, 1977 meeting of the Committee on Education,
provided:
SECTION 7. State university system.-There shall be a single state university
system comprised of all public four-year, upper level and graduate institutions of
higher learning. The state university system shall be governed by a board of regents.
The board of regents shall operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for
the management of the state university system subject to the powers of the legislature to authorize the expenditure of monies and the board shall account for such
expenditures as provided by law. The board of regents shall be a body corporate
composed of nine voting members; additional non-voting members may be provided by law.
The members of the board of regents shall be appointed by the governor subject
to confirmation by the senate. The voting members shall serve staggered terms of

six years.
Fla. C.R.C., Education Committee Minutes 3 (Oct. 19, 1977).
89. Id. at 2. Commissioner Kynes served as Florida's attorney general during 1963-64, and
as such he was also a member of the State Board of Education.
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current legislative control. 0 He described his proposal as a middle
ground between complete autonomy and a simple grant of constitutional status.9
Commissioner Yvonne Burkholz," a member of the committee,
moved unsuccessfully to amend the proposal to remove language
regarding funding by the legislature. The language provided that
the regents would manage the SUS "subject to the powers of the
legislature to authorize the expenditure of monies and this board
shall account for such expenditures as provided by law. 9' 3 Burkholz

noted that the language gave only an "illusory" limitation on the
proposed board's power; that power of the legislature to appropriate
is inherent, and thus the language was superfluous. 4 Commissioner
Kynes opposed her motion on the ground that the language was a
recognition that the regents should not be completely autonomous
but rather should be responsible to the legislature in spending its
appropriation. 5
Also raised at this meeting was the issue of whether Kynes' proposal required lump sum appropriation to the regents instead of a
line item approach, which allows the legislature to specify how an
individual recipient of legislatively appropriated funds must spend
those funds. The answer to this question was at best unclear, with
the two committee witnesses on the subject in disagreement."
Kynes' final word to the committee was that a lump sum appropriation to the SUS was not required by his proposal. He agreed with
90.

In vetoing Fla. SB 1230 (1977), Governor Askew said:
The university community is a vital element in a democracy, applying close and
necessary scrutiny to our institutions. The university must be free to cultivate a
spirit of inquiry and scholarly criticism-to examine ideas in an atmosphere of
freedom and confidence. However, it must also seek to maintain the confidence of
the community and state it serves.
Government must act with great restraint in considering measures which touch
upon the academic atmosphere of a university. Since the existing and recommended procedures in the State University System will deal adequately with the
problems this bill was intended to address, I believe Senate Bill 1230 to be unnecessary.
Letter from Governor Reubin Askew to Honorable Bruce Smathers (June 29, 1977) (on file
with the Secretary of State, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida).
91. Fla. C.R.C., Education Committee Minutes 2 (Oct. 19, 1977).
92. Commissioner Burkholz is a lobbyist for United Teachers of Dade, a teachers' union.
93. Fla. C.R.C., Education Committee Minutes 3 (Oct. 19, 1977).
94. Id.; Fla. C.R.C., Education Committee, tape recording of proceedings (Oct. 19, 1977).
95. Fla. C.R.C., Education Committee Minutes 3 (Oct. 19, 1977).
96. Marshall Criser, chairperson of the Board of Regents, said that the major change
required by the proposed revision would be that it would end line-item budgeting for education. Id. at 1. On the other hand, Dr. Kern Alexander, director of the Institute for Education
Finance, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, stated that lump sum appropriation
would not necessarily be required under the proposal. Id. at 2.
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one of the witnesses that, on its face, the proposal did not require
such a funding method."
The issue of appropriations and the regents' power was again
addressed in the committee's report to the commission. The report
stated that, among other things, the intent of the proposed revision
was to delineate the responsibilities which the regents would exercise in supervising the operation of the SUS while maintaining general legislative power over state monies appropriated to the SUS.
The report specifically stated that the "legislative authority over
appropriation of funds and post-audit of expenditures by the state
university system [would] remain unaltered by constitutional recognition of the board of regents.""
The issue of the method of funding (whether by lump sum or by
category of appropriation) is particularly important because historically the legislature has exercised much of its control over the higher
education system via the appropriations process. An example of the
type of control exercised by the legislature is seen in the 1978 general
appropriations bill." In addition to provisos specifying the amount
of funds to be expended from a variety of appropriation categories
such as salaries and benefits, other personal services, expenses, and
operating capital outlay on a particular project or college, the bill
also manifests broad policies applicable to the SUS. For instance,
under the Division of Universities heading in the bill, an order of
priority is specified for providing resources for program levels in the
SUS.1O As an example, the bill directs the establishment of a re97.

Id.

98. Fla. C.R.C., Interim Report by the Committee on Education (Group B) 5 (Nov. 15,
1977). The full declaration of intent is as follows:
It is the intent of this revision of Article IX, New Section 7 to grant constitutional
status to the board of regents and to delineate the responsibilities which the board
of regents would exercise in supervising the operation of the state university system.
It is the intent of the Committee on Education that the legislative authority over
appropriation of funds and post-audit of expenditures by the state university system remain unaltered by constitutional recognition of the board of regents. The
proposed revision describes the membership of the board of regents providing for
appointment by the governor with confirmation by the Senate. Further, it is the
intent of the committee to limit the board of regents to staggered six year terms.

Id.
99. Fla. SB 1100 (1978).
100. Id. at 48. The proviso provides in its entirety:
IT IS THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE THAT THE ORDER OF PRIORITY FOR PROVIDING RESOURCES FOR PROGRAMS IN THE STATE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM SHALL BE AS FOLLOWS:
1. UPPER LEVEL UNDERGRADUATE
2. LOWER LEVEL UNDERGRADUATE
3. MASTERS LEVEL GRADUATE
4. DOCTORAL LEVEL GRADUATE
5. ALL REMAINING PROGRAMS
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search center at one university and designates it as the "lead agency
for the coordination and development of research projects" related
to noxious aquatic plant control. 0'
Should the Board of Regents attain constitutional status, the
question will arise whether this type of legislative control will be
constitutionally permissible. It is true that the conditions and provisos in the appropriations law do not carry their own enforcement
provisions. But the legislature maintains oversight and monitoring
procedures to detect noncompliance with its directives, and violations are certain to cause serious repercussions in subsequent appropriations. 02
Lump sum appropriations for the SUS would give the Board of
Regents tremendous flexibility, allowing the regents total control
over the distribution of funds within the SUS. A lump sum appropriation would eliminate fifty of fifty-one line items in the 1978
appropriations bill directing how the amount appropriated may be
spent. Instead, the bill simply would provide a lump sum for universities with no breakdown as to categories of use. 13
As noted above, Commissioner Kynes' final word to the commission was that lump sum funding was not required by the revision.
In a personal statement to the commission at its last meeting, he
refuted such claims, stating:
IT IS FURTHER THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE THAT ADEQUATE
RESOURCES SHALL BE PROVIDED TO INSURE HIGH QUALITY IN EACH
PROGRAM BEGINNING WITH THE FIRST PRIORITY PROGRAM AND PROCEEDING THROUGH EACH NEXT HIGHEST PRIORITY PROGRAM TO
THE EXTENT THAT RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE. IT IS FURTHER THE
INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE THAT THE BOARD OF REGENTS SHALL
CONTINUE TO ALLOCATE THE RESOURCES APPROPRIATED TO THE
STATE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM AMONG THE VARIOUS UNIVERSITIES IN
SUCH A MANNER AS TO FULFILL THE PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED BY
THE LEGISLATURE.
101. Id. at 51. The proviso provides in its entirety:
INCLUDED IN ITEMS 404 THROUGH 405 IS $300,000 TO ESTABLISH A CENTER FOR AQUATIC WEED RESEARCH AS A FUNCTIONAL ELEMENT OF
THE INSTITUTE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA. THE CENTER IS HEREBY DESIGNATED AS THE
LEAD AGENCY FOR THE COORDINATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH PROJECTS RELATED TO NOXIOUSA QUA TIC PLANT CONTROL
AND IS DIRECTED TO COORDINATE ALL SUCH PROGRAMS WITH
OTHER AFFECTED AGENCIES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, AS PRESCRIBEDBY SECTION 372.925, FLORIDA STATUTES.
Id. (emphasis added).
102. Conversation with James Zingale, deputy director, Appropriations Committee, Florida Senate (May 15, 1978).
103. Id.
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It does not subvert the inherent power of the legislature to exercise
its rightful authority for oversight of the system in the spending of
public funds. It does not mandate lump sum appropriations, it
being recognized by the commission that the approval and oversight of the expenditure of tax revenues is and should be the legislature's prerogative."'
Throughout the remainder of the commission's proceedings,
Commissioner Kynes contended unrelentingly that his proposal was
not intended to grant autonomy to the Board of Regents.10 5 Basically, a grant of total constitutional autonomy to the regents would
confer on the board a legal status equal to that of the legislative or
the executive branch of government.106 The legislature's control over
the university system would be restricted to its powers of appropriation, postaudit, and the creation and abolition of institutions. And,
of course, restrictions or requirements of the state and federal constitutions would also apply to the regents.1' 7 Additionally, the legislature would not be able to enlarge, remove, or contract the powers
and duties of the regents. 0 8 But this would result from the mere fact
104. Statement of James W. Kynes to Fla. C.R.C. 8 (May 5, 1978) (emphasis in original)
(available in the art. IX, § 2 reference file of the Constitution Revision Commission)
[hereinafter cited as Kynes' Statement].
105. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 194 (Nov. 22, 1977) (remarks of James Kynes).
This provision does not, and I repeat does not, grant autonomy to the regents nor
to the state university system. Both the system and the regents are subject to the
coordinating authority of the state board of education to insure there be a complete
compatibility of our several systems of public education. This would include coordination of K-12, vocational education, community colleges, and the state university
system. There is authority for continuing legislative oversight including the power
of [the] legislature to deal with policy through the appropriations process and by
the full burden placed on the regents to justify both the expenditure of funds in
the appropriations stage and by accountability for such expenditures on a post
audit basis. Any conclusions that this provision grants autonomy to the regents and
the system is erroneous and statements to the contrary are misleading and done
only with a motive to throw a smoke screen over an otherwise sound approach. For
example, it has been argued that this proposal would enable the regents to merge
Florida A & M University and Florida State. That is absurd. That decision would
necessarily need legislative approval.
Kynes' Statement, supra note 104, at 7.
106. See People v. Kewen, 10 P. 393 (Cal. 1886); State ex rel. Univ. of Minn. v. Chase,
220 N.W. 951 (Minn. 1928).
107. See J. Beckham, Constitutional Autonomy and the State University System of Florida 124-25 (undated) (available from the Institute for Education Finance, University of Florida). This is an extensive treatment of the effect of constitutional autonomy on boards of
higher education and the form and nature such status takes, as well as an analysis of the
current status of Florida's Board of Regents.
108. California State Employees Ass'n v. Flournoy, 108 Cal. Rptr. 251 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); State ex rel. Univ. of Minn. v. Chase, 220 N.W.
951 (Minn. 1928); King v. Board of Regents, 200 P.2d 221 (Nev. 1948).
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of constitutional mention rather than from any protected status
prescribed by the proposal.
B.

The Debate

Education committee discussions and commission debate revealed that the principal reason for the proposed elevation of the
Board of Regents to constitutional status was the amount and nature of control exercised by the legislature over the SUS.
As originally drafted, the revision left little power to the legislature. The regents held total management powers over the SUS
"subject only to the power of the legislature to authorize expenditures and require an accounting of such expenditures."' 10 Legislative
members of the commission railed in unison at this approach, and
one of them, Commissioner James, moved that the "subject only"
provision be replaced with "as provided by law. '"" 0 James explained
that his amendment would still grant constitutional status to the
regents and provide in the constitution that they would "operate,
regulate, control and be fully responsible" for the management of
the SUS-but only as provided by law. He stated that without his
amendment, Kynes' proposal would give the Board of Regents total
constitutional autonomy."'
Commissioner Kynes countered James' effort by proposing an
amendment to the amendment, making the Board of Regents' powers "as provided by law not inconsistent with this section.""12 Kynes
said his amendment would make it clear that the responsibility for
the management and operation of the internal affairs of the university system was left to the regents."' In response to a question by
Commissoner Burkholz, Kynes stated that the amendment would
prohibit the legislature from addressing academic calendars, ad4
mission standards and tuition waivers.1
The amendment as amended was adopted,"' but at the commission's next meeting it was reconsidered and replaced with language
offered by Commissioner Ware."' Ware's amendment limited the
109. See note 88 supra.
110. Amendment 1 to Proposal 93, Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 166 (Nov. 22,
1977) (remarks of William James).
111. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 167 (Nov. 22, 1977).
112. Amendment to Amendment 1 to Proposal 93, id. at 168.
113. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 168 (Nov. 22, 1977).
114. Id. at 171-72.
115. Id. at 194. The vote was 26-2. 11 Fla. C.R.C. Jour. 201 (Nov. 22, 1977).
116. Language identical to this amendment was proposed at the commission's November
22, 1977 meeting but was withdrawn. Id. at 201-02. On introducing his language, Ware
stated that it would "assure that the Board of Regents [would] have the authority to operate

868

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:851

power of the Board of Regents under the proposal by inserting the
phrase "provided that the Board of Regents shall be subject to
general law other than on matters relating exclusively to the educational policy of the state university system.""' 7
In support of his amendment, Ware stated that the proposal as
amended previously by the commission'" subjected the Board of
Regents to the legislature's power to authorize expenditures of monies. He said he thought that the general laws of the state applicable
to subject matter within the state's police power should also control
the SUS. "[The present language] concerns me because I think
that the general laws of the State of Florida applicable to other
subject matters shouldalso control the state university system and
things such as program compatibility between the community colleges and the university system.""' He emphasized, however, that
his intent was not to affect the proscription against legislative interference.2 0 Rather, he stated that "issues with statewide application" would remain under legislative control.'
[The amendment says] that there is some level of control that
should be uniform around the state, when we have things with
collective bargaining, when we have issues of open meetings, when
we have issues of how much it's going to cost to send the kids to
school, and [whether] the community college programs are going
to be coordinated with the university system so that when you
complete a community college program those credits are accepted
application
in the universities. Those are issues with state-wide
22
and not based solely on educational policy.
Kynes contended that the amendment was unnecessary because the
proposal already provided that the board was subject to general law
aimed at protecting the general welfare of the state. He stated:
and exclusively take care of the educational policy of the state university system, but not
remove legislative control over such things as the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act, the
Id.
I..."
at 202.
Sunshine Law .
117. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 143 (Dec. 6, 1977).
118. The text of the proposal as previously amended by the commission on Nov. 22, 1977,
to which Ware was referring, is:
The board of regents shall operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for
the management of the state university system as provided by law not inconsistent
with this section. The board of regents shall be a body corporate composed of nine
voting members; additional non-voting members may be provided by law.
Fla. C.R.C., Proposal 93.
119. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 144 (Dec. 6, 1977).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 144-45.
122. Id.
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I think it is abundantly clear . . . that the Board of Regents
[under this provision] is subject to the general law as it relates to
the general welfare of the state. Matters such as the Sunshine Law
and open government and. . . collective bargaining, or what have
you, which [are] matter[s] which might be considered by the
legislature in overseeing the function of all state agencies.' 3
C.

The Student Regent

Under present Florida law, one member of the Board of Regents
is a full-time student in the SUS.24 The Board of Regents proposal
does not speak directly to the issue of a student member. The commission adopted the proposed revision prior to gubernatorial approval of an amendment to the present law granting the student
24
regent the power to vote. '
The proposal does, however, provide that one regent shall serve a
two-year term and that the qualifications of this regent shall be
prescribed by the legislature.' 25 Commission debate indicates that
the purpose of providing a two-year term, with the member's qualifications left to legislative discretion, was to leave the question of a
student regent to the legislature. 2 Presumably the legislature will
amend the current law to specify that the two-year slot on the constitutional Board of Regents shall be filled by a student of the SUS.
Legislative resistance could be bypassed altogether if the Governor
appointed a student to a six-year term, which he could do since the
qualifications of these members are not addressed in the proposal.'2
V.

A.

CONCLUSION

The State Board of Education and the
Commissioner of Education

The proposed revision of article IX is a needed step toward a more
stable and unified public education system for Florida.
Appointment, rather than election, of the central policymaking
and coordinating body of the state education system has been recommended by a majority of the education studies completed in
Florida to date. The 1929 Educational Commission recommended
a lay State Board of Education, appointed by the Governor, which
would select its own commissioner of education. It further recom123.
124.
124.1.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 146.
§ 240.011(1) (1977).
Act of June 26, 1978, ch. 78-416, § 10, 1978 Fla. Laws 1368.
Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IX, § 7(c).
2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 4 (Mar. 9, 1978) (remarks of James Kynes).
Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 1, at art. IX, § 7(c).
FLA. STAT.
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mended that the commissioner possess certain educational qualifications. 28 Its major criticism of the education system at the time
was that there were no qualifications for the commissioner of education-only that he or she have the ability to write his or her own
name and obtain enough votes to be elected. The commission also
attacked time restraints rendering the ex-officio board incapable of
adequately serving as a State Board.'2
The 1947 study committee substantially agreed with the recommendations of its predecessor. The committee gave four reasons for
replacing the State Board with a non-Cabinet board, finding that
the Cabinet board was unable to do the job of coordinating and
integrating the public education system. First, the board governs
universities by remote control. Second, board members hold position only by virtue of their election to office, so that citizens have
no assurance of continuity in the board's work. Third, qualification
for a particular Cabinet office does not necessarily make someone
qualified to pass on important education questions. Fourth, all Cabinet members are too busy with the jobs to which they were elected
to think and plan constructively for a comprehensive education pro30
gram. 1
The 1967 commission's recommendations were a variation on the
theme of an appointed, lay State Board of Education. This study
recommended retaining the Cabinet but putting overall policy ques3
tions in the hands of a separate appointed commission. '
In 1973, the most recent commission132 made the appointment of
a lay State Board .of Education to coordinate all levels of public
education its "highest priority recommendation" in the area of governance. However, the committee recommended that this change be
effected by statute and that the present State Board of Education
retain its constitutional role.
128. The Florida Educational Survey Commission, Official Report 30 (1929) (available in
the art. IX, § 2 reference file of the Constitution Revision Commission).
129. Id. at 29.
130. Florida Citizens Committee on Education, Education and the Future of Florida 296
(March 1947) (available in the art. IX, § 2 reference file of the Constitution Revision Commission).
131. State of Florida, Governor's Commission For Quality Education in Florida, Toward
Excellence: Changing Concepts For Education in Florida 11 (Dec. 22, 1967) (available in the
art. IX, § 2 reference file of the Constitution Revision Commission).
132. This commission was composed of 22 individuals from all segments of society: the
state legislature (state legislators included Rep. (now Senator) Kenneth H. MacKay, Jr., Rep.
Robert M. Johnson, Rep. T. Terrell Sessums, Sen. Henry Sayler, and Sen. James H. Williams), business, industry, labor, and the legal and journalism professions. Constitution
Revision Commission members Donald H. Reed, Jr. and Elliott Messer served on the commission.
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HIGHEST PRIORITY RECOMMENDATION
The Committee believes that a board to coordinate and develop
policy for all levels of education is of such overriding importance
that it should be brought about even if no other changes are made
in the governance of education in Florida. Therefore, we recommend that:
Recommendation 85: The Legislature should create a lay board to
set policy and coordinate the entire state system of public education in Florida. The powers and responsibilities of this board
should be statutory and the present State Board of Education
should retain its constitutional role.'1
Advocates of the proposed change point out that citizen appointees selected for their proven contributions to education would be
"more knowledgeable and effective than a cabinet composed of politicians with specific interests" in agriculture, banking, or insurance."' Cabinet officers, they argue, echoing the findings of the
education survey commissions, are too busy with other matters to
give necessary detailed attention to education, 35 as well as being
subject to the distractions inherent in having to campaign for office
3
every four years.' 1
Clearly an appointed State Board of Education would have more
time for coordination and policymaking than an elected board
whose officers have many other duties. During 1977, the State Board
of Education met twenty-five times, spending an average of only six
and one-half minutes per meeting on education policy issues. A
recent study of educational policy issues addressed by the State
Board of Education shows that the board spent two hours forty-two
minutes in 1977 on educational policy matters. The board usually
37
spent a minute or less per meeting on educational policy matters,'
though over one-half of the state's yearly budget is spent on education programs.'13
One of the most outspoken opponents of an appointed education
commissioner and State Board of Education has been current Edu133. State of Florida, The Governor's Citizens' Committee on Education, Improving Education in Florida 75 (Mar. 15, 1973) (available in the art. IX, § 2 reference file of the Constitution Revision Commission).
134. St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 13, 1978, § B, at 1.
135. Florida Times-Union, Jan. 13, 1978.
136. Orlando Sentinel-Star, Jan. 26, 1978.
137. Memorandum, Office of the Governor, Policy Issues for State Board of Education
Consideration (Feb. 20, 1978) (available in the art. IX, § 2 reference file of the Constitution
Revision Commission).
138. The 1978-79 appropriations act set aside $1,770,939,244 to fund recurring day-to-day
operations of education institutions, compared to a total budgeted amount of $2,921,299,218
for all state-funded recurring expenditures. Fla. SB 1100 (1978).
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cation Commissioner Ralph Turlington. On several occasions he has
denounced the proposed change as a device for removing the voters'
right to choose their officials and to have a direct voice in education
matters.' 39 He has also defended the existing State Board against
charges that it spends only a few seconds each month on education
matters, pointing out that Cabinet aides and officers have spent
many unrecorded hours behind the scenes studying the issses.' 4°
Teachers' unions have expressed opposition to the suggested

change because they fear giving the Governor more power over education.' 4 ' Also, they have voiced doubt that appointed board members, who would most likely be busy business and civic leaders,
would have any more time to devote to education than current
Cabinet members."' Another possible reason for the unions' opposition suggested during the commission's debate was that elected
Cabinet officers are more easily influenced by organized interest
groups than appointed officials. Commissioner Don Reed, a lawyer
and a former legislator, pointed out that teacher unions have an
inordinate amount of power over elected officials because of the
thousands of votes behind their suggestions.1

3

During commission

debate, he remarked to Commissioner Burkholz, a union spokesman: "[W]hen I go before that Cabinet and I'm representing myself and one client, I've got two votes. When you walk in there you
have got 35,000. You're at least 34,998 more powerful than I am.
And they recognize votes. Believe me, they know how to count
votes."" 4
A final criticism concerns the confused state of the commission's
recommendation. The commission has recommended essentially
three methods of governing the state education system-and each
is radically different from the others.
On the one hand, the commission recommends an appointed
State Board with an appointed executive officer."15 On the other
hand, the commission recommends an appointed board and an
139. Florida Times-Union, Mar. 8, 1978. Commissioner Turlington has reversed his stance
on this issue since 1972, when he supported an amendment to art. IX, § 2 to provide that
the commissioner of education be appointed by a legislatively established State Board of
Education. See FLA. H.R. JouR. 222-23 (Reg. Sess. 1972). (Note that Turlington was a member of the legislature in 1972).
140. Florida Times-Union, Mar. 8, 1978.
141. St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 19, 1978, § D, at 4, col. 2.
142. Id.
143. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 292 (Nov. 21, 1977).
144. Id. at 295.
145. This is the recommendation if the revision of art. IV, § 4, abolishing the Cabinet, as
well as the revision to art. IX, § 2, is adopted.
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elected commissioner.'" The commission gives the voters still another choice: the legislature would have complete discretion with
regard to the state's education governance system, including the
choice of having no education system at all." 7 These three alternatives were probably inevitable for both political' and practical reasons.149
On balance, an appointed State Board headed by an appointed
executive officer is the best choice. Board members who were
elected to serve primarily in other capacities cannot possibly devote
the time and energy necessary to develop sound educational policies
for Florida. This choice will require the voters to abolish the elected
Cabinet as well, because of the current constitutional interrelationship between the two bodies. It is unfortunate that these two
issues cannot be separated, but Florida's political structure makes
it necessary to deal with the two together.
B.

The Board of Regents

As noted above, the major impetus behind the revision granting
constitutional status to the Board of Regents is to preclude inappropriate legislative involvement in the development and administration of educational policy matters in the SUS and to guarantee the
continued existence of the board.1re In support of the need for such
protection from the legislature, Commissioner Kynes cited a recent
legislative enactment requiring the creation of a censorship board
to review films and course curricula against pornography standards.' 5 He said such enactments constitute a threat to the stability
of the SUS.151 In defense of the legislature, it has been argued that
often legislators propose legislative involvement in the SUS, not
seriously intending to affect law, but rather to "draw attention" to
146. This is the recommendation if the revision of art. IV, § 4, abolishing the Cabinet,
fails, and the revision of art. IX, § 2 is adopted.
147. If the revision of art. IV, § 4, abolishing the Cabinet, is adopted and the revision of
art. IV, § 2 is rejected, then art. IX, § 2 will become a statute which may be amended by the
legislature without limit.
148. During the period in which the commission considered the issue, Education Commissioner Ralph Turlington threatened to fight abolition of the elected commissioner and Board
of Education if the proposal providing an appointed commissioner and board were adopted.
149. Once it became probable that the question of Cabinet abolition would be balloted
separately, the revision of art. IX, § 2, regarding the State Board of Education, which would
necessarily be affected, had to be changed to cover the varying contingencies.
150. See text accompanying notes 89-108 supra.
151. Fla. C.R.C., Education Committee Minutes 2 (Oct. 19, 1977). The bill referred to
was Fla. SB 1230 (1977), by Sen. Pat Thomas and others; it was vetoed by the Governor. FLA.
S. Joua. 1003 (Reg. Sess. 1977).
152. Fla. C.R.C., Education Committee Minutes 2 (Oct. 19, 1977).
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53
a particular problem and to stimulate discussion on the matter.'
In addition to his desire that legislative power over the BOR be
limited, Commissioner Kynes also supported the proposal as a way
of giving due recognition to the status and importance of higher
education. In his words,

This proposal is founded on the proposition that constitutional
status for the Board of Regents of the State University System not
only would be a recognition of the importance of higher education
in our state, but also the recognition that this is one of the most
important functions of Florida state government."'
With the exception of these arguments, the revision history is bare
of any strong sentiment for or against the proposal to give constitutional status to the Board of Regents. While strong objections were
raised originally to the concept of constitutional autonomy for the
newly created Board of Regents,155 the Ware amendment resolved
them by making the Board of Regents subject to the state's general
laws except with regard to matters relating exclusively to educational policy of the SUS. 156
C.

Summary

Education is probably the most important responsibility of the
state government. Giving full authority for educational policy matters to a board of officials elected to accomplish other tasks does not
make sense. Life in twentieth-century America is just too complex
to leave such an important function to people with only a few seconds to spare. We need a full-time board. And the head of that
board should be appointed to provide some measure of insulation
from the constant clamor of competing interest groups.
There appears to be less reason to constitutionalize the Board of
Regents. Legislative interference has on the whole failed in the past,
and there does not appear to be much more reason to adopt this
proposal than that. Certainly approval of the commission proposal
would prevent undue legislative interference in the future. In any
event, this proposal and the one creating an appointed State Board
of Education are to be voted up or down together. It is worth the
former to get the latter.
153.
(July 8,
154.
155.
156.

Conversation with Frank Caldwell, staff director, House Committee on Education
1978).
Fla. C.R.C., Education Committee Minutes 2 (Oct. 19, 1977).
See text accompanying note 110 supra.
See text accompanying notes 116-17 supra.
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The voters should approve the commission's proposed changes in
article IX.

